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ABSTRACT 
The paper argues against Peacocke’s moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I 
show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke’s account 
has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account’s 
metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards 
to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, 
once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the 




1. Introduction  
Modal epistemology has flourished. A lot has been written since van Inwagen wrote 
(1998) that “Modal epistemology is a subject about which little is known” (75). One 
way to motivate the question that modal epistemologists are trying to answer is by 
analogy to Benacerraf’s dilemma for mathematics.1 Let us assume modal mind-
independence.2 If we assume further that we have modal knowledge, the challenge 
arises as to how we are able to obtain knowledge of the extra-mental modal realm. For 
our senses give us access to what is actually the case, but it is not clear that they give 
us access to what is merely possible, necessary, or impossible. This challenge has 
traditionally been presented in the literature as involving the need for a necessity-
sensitive faculty that would enable us to recognize modal facts, followed by the claim 
that we cannot make sense of such a faculty.3 The idea behind the alleged need for 
this faculty is the so-called ‘causal account of knowledge’, which would require all 
knowledge to be fundamentally grounded in causal affection. (Benacerraf 1973, 661).  
 One might dislike this way of motivating the challenge. However, the idea of a 
potential need for this faculty is still dominant in the literature, to the extent that 
some—most notably the rationalists—are explicitly interested in denying that we need 
it (e.g., (Peacocke 1999, 189)) while others are explicitly interested in naturalizing it, 
thereby reducing its mysteriousness (e.g., (Williamson 2007), (Kment 2006)).  
 
Vaidya (2007) has classified accounts of modal knowledge in three main groups. 
There are counterfactual-based accounts (e.g., (Hill 2006), (Williamson 2007)), 
according to which modal epistemology is a special case of the epistemology of 
counterfactuals. There are conceivability-based accounts (e.g., (Yablo 1993), 
(Menzies 1998), (Chalmers 2002)), according to which modal knowledge is somehow 
                                                 
1  See (Benacerraf 1973). 
2  For a stimulating discussion about different notions of mind-independence, see (Jenkins 2005). 
3  See (Blackburn 1986) and (Craig 1985) for two such formulations. 
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inferred from conceivability knowledge with the aid of a thesis that would 
appropriately link p’s conceivability and p’s possibility. And there are understanding-
based accounts (e.g., (Bealer 1999, 2002), (Peacocke 1999 and 2002)), according to 
which possession of concepts and understanding of contents is the main source of 
modal knowledge.4  
 Counterfactual- and conceivability-based accounts have received most attention 
in the recent years, and one can find in the literature several criticisms against them.5 
While those criticisms are not decisive, the initial unreflective enthusiasm for these 
kinds of accounts is no longer in good health. This decrease in optimism makes the 
exploration of alternative approaches a somehow urgent task.  
 One such alternative—the target of this paper—is Peacocke’s understanding-
based account which, despite its numerous attractive features, has not received due 
attention. Something that the epistemologies mentioned hitherto have in common is 
the presupposition that modal truth is mind-independent. What makes Peacocke’s 
account especially interesting is that it is specifically designed with a view to meeting 
the epistemic challenge in a way that is appropriate to the account’s mind-independent 
and metaphysical commitments. It is, therefore, specifically designed to meet what 
Peacocke calls ‘the Integration Challenge’; a problem of reconciliation (Peacocke 
1999, p.1). 
 It is worth noting that the plausibility of the account’s metaphysics is not 
parasitic upon the plausibility of the account’s epistemology. This is good news in 
relation to the aim of this paper. I shall argue below that Peacocke’s epistemology of 
modality is unsatisfactory, but I am sympathetic to the account’s metaphysics of 
modality. Nothing developed in the course of my criticisms against Peacocke’s 
epistemology suggests that the metaphysics of modality of the account is also in need 
of revision. On the contrary, Peacocke’s metaphysics of modality—a kind of 
linguistic ersatzism—is one of the most sophisticated and elaborated ones, and 
possibly one of the strongest versions of linguistic ersatzism that have been developed 
after Lewis’ objections (1986) to this variety of ersatzism. In addition, and unlike 
Lewis’ genuine realism, a metaphysics along the lines of Peacocke’s can easily 
accommodate impossible worlds without additional ontological extravagance,6 and 
this is also good news in a context in which impossible worlds are increasingly called 
for.7  
 As far as the epistemology of modality is concerned, most of the task of this 
paper is negative. I argue that an epistemology along the lines of Peacocke’s is not 
                                                 
4  One should not understand this taxonomy as exclusive, though. For instance, Williamson’s 
epistemology of modality is both a counterfactual-based account and a conceivability-based account.  
5  Against counterfactual-based accounts, see (Vaidya 2007), (Jenkins 2008a) and (Roca-Royes, 
forthcomingb). Against conceivability-based account, see (Worley 2003), (Brueckner 2001), (Lowe 
2007), (Wright 2002a) and (Roca-Royes, forthcominga).  
6  I couldn’t explain why this is so better than Nolan does in (1997, 541-2). 
7  See (Nolan 1997, 536-541) for a survey of their applications.  
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satisfactory. For reasons I have developed elsewhere,8 I also think that conceivability- 
and counterfactual-based accounts are not in a good position either. Yet, I believe that 
we possess modal knowledge, and that this calls for an epistemology of modality. 
There is, therefore, a lot to be done in terms of developing a positive account. To the 
reader’s dissatisfaction, however, this task falls beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 As indicated above, Peacocke’s metaphysics of modality will not be discussed 
here. I will take issue, however, with Peacocke’s metaphysics of modal concepts. 
Peacocke believes that modal concepts are very rich in content. So rich that they 
imply possession conditions that might well be found implausible on their own. I find 
it objectionable too that the content that Peacocke endows modal concepts with seems 
to have been chosen with the Integration Challenge in mind. It is, suspiciously, the 
minimum amount of content required for the implementation of Peacocke’s moderate 
rationalism. If I am right that his epistemology is unsuccessful for independent 
reasons, nothing would be lost if we endorsed a thinner view on modal concepts. 
Again, a thinner view on the metaphysics of modal concepts is still compatible with 
the account’s metaphysics of modality, so nothing developed here will go against it 
either. Something to be highlighted, however, is that, to avoid implausible 
commitments regarding the possession conditions for modal concepts, modal concepts 
will need to be thin to an extent that will make Peacocke’s moderate rationalism 
unworkable.  
 The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I briefly present the key elements of 
Peacocke’s account (and provide source pages when appropriate). In §3, I argue that 
the account’s epistemology is unsatisfactory and reply to an anticipated objection to 
my criticisms. In §4, I briefly anticipate the dialectical impact of §5 in relation to §3. 
In §5, I offer reasons against Peacocke’s metaphysics of modal concepts and suggest 
my amendment, which will result in an account incapable of supporting Peacocke’s 
moderate rationalism. Last section (§6) recapitulates and offers some remarks about 
the prospects of the resulting, modified account favoured here.  
 
2.  Meeting the Integration Challenge: Moderate Rationalism 
As stated above, the Integration Challenge is the challenge of reconciling the 
metaphysics and the epistemology of a given domain. The way Peacocke thinks this 
reconciliation should be achieved in modality is by means of a moderately rationalist 
strategy. Moderate rationalism “seeks to explain cases of a priori knowledge by 
appeal to the nature of the concepts that feature in contents that are known a priori” 
(Peacocke 2004, 199). In this section, and avoiding any unnecessary detail, I will first 
survey Peacocke’s metaphysics of modality to then focus on his integrated 
epistemology.    
                                                 
8  (Roca-Royes, forthcominga) and (Roca-Royes, forthcomingb). 
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 At the metaphysical level, Peacocke identifies possible worlds with sets of 
thoughts and propositions, determined by a set of Principles of Possibility. Let us see 
how he gets there.  
 An assignment, s, is a 4-tuple <Ds, vals, propvals, exts> where Ds is its associated 
domain; vals is a function from concepts to extensions; propvals is a function from 
atomic concepts to properties and relations; and exts is a function from properties and 
relations to extensions. Only those assignments that satisfy all Principles of 
Possibility are admissible. For any assignment, s, the set of thoughts and propositions 
that s counts as true is called ‘s-specification’. The set of possible worlds is identified 
with the set of those specifications that correspond to admissible assignments. The 
concept <possibility>, therefore, applies to specifications (and correctly so only to 
some of them: the possible worlds). By contrast, <admissibility> applies to 
assignments (and correctly so only to those who do not violate any Principle of 
Possibility). 
 The (first-order) Principles of Possibility divide into the Modal Extension 
Principle (MEP), and a battery of Constitutive Principles. The main idea underlying 
MEP is that any concept is governed by a certain rule, R, whose application 
determines, in each case, the actual extension of the concept: 
Modal Extension Principle. An assignment s is admissible only if: for any concept 
C, the semantic value of C according to s is the result of applying the same rule as 
is applied in the determination of the actual semantic value of C. (Peacocke 1999, 
136) 
MEP rules, at the level of concepts, what the Constitutive Principles rule at the level 
of reference: namely, that admissible assignments respect constitutive relations. 
Peacocke provides a couple of examples of plausible Constitutive Principles. The first 
one here concerns the fundamental kind of an object:  
If P is a property which is an object x’s fundamental kind, then an assignment is 
inadmissible if it counts the proposition x is P as false. (Peacocke 1999, 145) 
Under the assumption that it is constitutive of a person a that she originates in the 
particular sperm b and egg cell c from which she actually originated, the following is 
also a constitutive principle (for a): 
An assignment is inadmissible if it both counts the proposition a exists as true and 
counts the proposition a develops from b and c as false. (Peacocke 1999, 146) 
The first-order principles provide necessary conditions for an assignment to be 
admissible. A second-order principle, Constrained Recombination, states that they are 
jointly sufficient. These are the principles, therefore, that fix "a rule for determining 
the actual extension of the concept admissible.” (Peacocke 1999, 151) 
 
The Integration Challenge is met by letting the Principles of Possibility play two roles 
in the account. First, they determine the set of possible worlds—this is the 
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metaphysical role just sketched. Second, they constitute the possession conditions for 
the concept <possibility>, and our implicit knowledge of them is thereby guiding our 
modal judgements. Let us see how the combination of these two roles would make 
the account meet the Integration Challenge. The Principles of Possibility encode 
constitutive (essential) truths, and should be conceived of as the axioms (or 
metaphysical laws) to be satisfied for an arbitrary set of thoughts and propositions to 
be counted as a genuine possibility. Where C* is the set of all assignments, the 
metaphysical role of the principles is to divide C* into two: the set of admissible 
ones, and the complementary set of inadmissible ones. In turn, these principles are 
constitutive of the concept <possibility>, meaning by this that one does not possess 
the concept unless one has implicit knowledge of them. This, combined with the first, 
metaphysical role, implies that, merely in virtue of possessing the concept 
<possibility>, one has implicit access to (which) possible worlds (there are). Possible 
worlds are the truth-makers for modal claims. Consequently, possession of 
<possibility> gives us epistemic access to modal truth. Our modal beliefs, therefore, 
can safely be given the epistemic status of knowledge:  
If it is granted that implicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility is 
appropriately employed in reaching modal judgement, we can see how the 
judgement so reached is knowledge. Provided that any non-modal principles upon 
which she relies are known, a thinker’s modal judgements reached by the proper 
use of the implicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility will, in the nature of 
the case, be knowledge. This is not only a matter of reliability. The judgement of 
the modal truth is explained by the thinker’s implicit grasp of principles which 
make the modal truth hold. (Peacocke 1999, 162) 
The account avoids commitment to a necessity-sensitive faculty because modal 
knowledge is achieved, according to moderate rationalism, by (implicit) reasoning 
from the Principles of Possibility, thereby avoiding the need for “causal interaction 
with a modal realm” (Peacocke 2004, 222). 
 In sum, modal knowledge is analysed as consequential upon our implicit 
knowledge of the Principles of Possibility, such that the epistemic status of our modal 
beliefs is inherited from the epistemic status of the Principles of Possibility. The 
(fairly uncontroversial) assumption here is that known premises—Principles of 
Possibility—and valid reasoning lead to known conclusions—Modal Knowledge.  
 This is a good first step towards meeting the challenge. Especially when, 
blocking a potential charge of circularity, and appealing to Kit Fine’s views on the 
notion of essence, Peacocke takes the Principles of Possibility to be non-modal. 
According to (Fine 1994), constitutive—i.e., essential—facts are ontologically prior to 
modal ones. Modal truth is, in Fine’s approach, ontologically consequential upon 
constitutive truth. This ontological analysis is used by Peacocke to defend the non-
circularity of his parallel epistemological analysis, according to which modal 
knowledge is consequential upon constitutive knowledge.  
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3.  The Revenge of the Integration Challenge.  
If Peacocke were to leave things there, however, one could complain that, rather than 
solving the challenge, he has only moved it from the domain of explicit modal 
knowledge to the domain of implicit knowledge about the constitutive. As he puts it: 
The provision of a general theory of the constitutive, as opposed to the modal, 
seems to me to be an urgent task for philosophy. We certainly do not want all the 
initial puzzlement about modality simply to be transferred to the domain of the 
constitutive. Only a satisfactory general theory of the constitutive, and an attendant 
epistemology, can allay this concern. (Peacocke 1999, 166 fn.) 
This worry is justified; and pressing. Peacocke’s claim that modal beliefs reached by 
reasoning constitute modal knowledge presupposes that we know the Principles of 
Possibility. Our knowledge that a necessarily originates from o, for instance, is 
grounded, on his account, in our implicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility, 
which somehow include knowledge that a essentially originates from o. It would be 
objectionable to say—and I dare to speculate that this is why Peacocke doesn’t say 
it—that, since constitutive knowledge is not modal knowledge, the challenge for 
modal knowledge has been met. First, Fine’s ontological divorce between the modal 
and the constitutive does not amount to a divorce in epistemological worries. On the 
contrary, after the divorce, the same challenge should be phrased in terms of both 
modal and constitutive knowledge. Second, it seems generally true that, when we 
know about  because we infer it from Ψ, the knowability conditions for -facts are 
not fully elucidated unless the knowability conditions for Ψ-facts are. This is what 
Peacocke is laudably acknowledging in the above quotation.  
 We should then enquire about the nature of constitutive facts so that we know, 
broadly, the kind of constitutive epistemology we should be aiming at. We know that 
modal truth is ontologically consequential from constitutive truth and that the former 
is mind-independent for Peacocke. So should be the latter, therefore. Consequently, 
we should aim at an epistemology of mind-independent constitutive facts. We can call 
this ‘the revenge of the integration challenge’ because, as Peacocke suspects, the 
success of his epistemology of modality depends on the success of his (or an) 
epistemology of the constitutive. Furthermore, once modal knowledge has been 
analyzed as consequential upon our constitutive knowledge, and given that there is no 
particular mystery in how one arrives at the former from the latter, the mysteriousness 
of modal knowledge is indeed transferred to constitutive knowledge. As a result, most 
of the action to demystify modal knowledge will be in the as-of-yet-missing 
epistemology of the constitutive.  
 Peacocke (2001) starts developing this “urgent task” after being pressed by 
Heathcote (2001). There, he gives two answers to how we (can) know the Principles. 
One of them addresses their explicit knowability and the other one their implicit 
knowability. In what follows, I will argue against these answers that they do not 
constitute the “attendant epistemology” of the constitutive Peacocke finds urgent. 
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3.1. Explicit knowledge of the Principles 
Peacocke’s first answer describes a two-step process that would result in explicit a 
priori knowledge of the Principles. At the first step of the process, we would identify a 
set of a priori known modal propositions.  
At the second step, we go on to ask ‘What is the best explanation of the meaning of 
necessity that would accord with the truth of these modal propositions that are 
known a priori?’. I contend that the best explanation is that necessity conforms to 
the Principles of Possibility. This is an a priori abduction, from a priori data about 
the truth of certain modal propositions, to a conclusion about the best a priori 
explanation of why they are true. (Peacocke 2001, 112) 
To illustrate this with a one-proposition example, suppose that we identified the a 
priori known modal proposition that if something is human, it is necessarily human, 
and let its singleton be the abductive base. By means of the second step, we would 
abductively arrive at the conclusion that necessity conforms to the principle that if 
something is human, it is essentially human (plausibly an instance of Essentiality of 
Kind).  
 
I will argue that this answer is dialectically ineffective. At the first step, Peacocke 
asks us to identify a set of a priori known modal propositions. Recall, however, that, in 
Peacocke’s account, modal beliefs are given the epistemic status of knowledge to the 
extent that they inherit it from the epistemic status of the Principles of Possibility. If 
we had an independent epistemic route to those modal propositions (if we had, for 
instance, an independent way to know that if something is human, it is necessarily 
human), that route could be appealed to, at the end of the second step, to support the 
claim that the principles at which we have abductively arrived are also known 
(continuing the example: if something is human, it is essentially human). In the 
absence of independent routes, however, the mere assumption that there is a set of a 
priori known modal propositions on which to base the abduction will prove 
ineffective to close the argumentative gap Peacocke wants to close.  
 Before elaborating on this, let me be clear that I am not objecting to Peacocke’s 
reliance on abductive reasoning as a knowledge-conducive method, or to his 
assumption about (a priori) modal knowledge. I will only argue for the dialectical 
ineffectiveness of the particular reasoning he offers. To do so, I will present two cases 
that should help us to formulate the problem more precisely. 
 Case One: Let us consider what would be the output of the two-step process in 
the dramatic event that, constituting our modal concepts, we had only (mind-
independent) false implicit beliefs about the constitutive. This implicit conception will 
have an impact on our modal judgements and, consequently, the abductive base would 
be constituted by false modal beliefs. By running the two-step process, we would 
arrive at an explicit formulation of the content of the implicit conception associated to 
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our (hypothetically deviant) modal concepts. By assumption—that the implicit 
conception contains only false statements about the constitutive—plus facticity of 
knowledge, however, this cannot amount to explicit knowledge of the constitutive 
principles. It should be granted that, whether we are using deviant or accurate modal 
concepts, we can run the two-step process. This first case shows that such a process 
might be a good way to explicitly articulate implicit conceptions. It is not, however, a 
process that would by itself justify the epistemic status of knowledge ascribed to our 
beliefs about the constitutive.  
 Case Two: The implicit conception associated to our modal concepts consists of 
true implicit beliefs. However, it is by mere epistemic luck that our modal concepts 
encode the truths of the constitutive realm. In other words, we implicitly possess the 
truth about the constitutive, but in a way insufficient for knowledge. If modal beliefs 
inherit their epistemic status from the epistemic status of the implicit conception 
associated to our modal concepts, then we do not know modal truths; we merely 
believe them.9 These true modal beliefs that we possess can arguably be used as our 
abductive base to run the two-step process Peacocke describes. As in Case One, 
however, this might amount to explicit knowledge of what the elements of that 
implicit conception are, and also to explicit beliefs that those elements state 
constitutive truths. By assumption, however, it will hardly amount to constitutive 
knowledge. 
 
One might object that cases One and Two are irrelevant to make a case against 
Peacocke’s first answer since these two cases are ruled out by Peacocke. His 
abductive base consists of a priori known modal propositions, and this is already 
incompatible with our two cases above. He then claims that running the two-step 
abductive process will deliver explicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility—we 
arrive at knowledge, because we departed from knowledge.  
 I agree that this is Peacocke’s scenario. Cases One and Two show, nonetheless, 
that Peacocke’s assumption that we have an abductive base with known modal 
propositions is not dispensable. What we need to evaluate now is whether this 
abduction-answer constitutes an epistemology of the constitutive adequate to play the 
role that Peacocke needs it to play: namely, that of completing his epistemology of 
modality. I shall argue that it does not.  
 Peacocke is very clear about why he needs an epistemology of the constitutive. 
To recall, this is how he elucidates modal knowledge:  





Explicit modal knowledge 
(EMK) 
 
                                                 
9 To see why non-accidentality is important, see Jenkins’ similar concerns (2008b, 56-65) to the 
effect that accidentality would be knowledge-destroying. 
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As seen at the beginning of §3, Peacocke finds this incomplete because, given the 
epistemic dependence of (EMK) upon (IKC), (IKC) needs to be elucidated too. This is 
what Peacocke offers now about the explicit knowability of the principles: 








Cases One and Two above show the way in which (EKC) depends on (EMK)—that is, 
how (EKC) depends on modal knowledge as opposed to modal beliefs, whether true 
or false. According to the only epistemic elucidation of (EMK) we have been given, 
(EMK) depends, in turn, on (IKC)—we haven’t been given any independent route to 
(EMK). Peacocke’s views on the explicit knowability of constitutive truths, therefore, 
are not suitable to solve the argumentative deficit he identifies. On the contrary, it 
only expands the explanatory chain in the wrong direction:  
 
If there was an incompleteness problem before—as Peacocke grants and not without 
good reasons—there is the same incompleteness problem now. Our target question is: 
How do we know x to be a constitutive truth? Peacocke’s answer might be a correct 
answer to: How can we know the principles explicitly, once we know them implicitly? 
A correct answer to this second question, however, falls short of what Peacocke needs 
to complete his modal epistemology.  
 Before turning to Peacocke’s views on the implicit knowability of the principles, 
let me address an objection someone might raise against my criticism. My reply to 
this objection will in turn prepare the grounds for my objection (in §3.3) to 
Peacocke’s answer to the problem of the implicit knowability of the principles.  
 
3.2 Objection and reply 
One might complain that the objection above neglects a crucial aspect of Peacocke’s 
theory on which I will now elaborate. I will explain why, despite the fact that the 
worry is justified, my criticisms are fair nonetheless. To do so, I will identify an 
assumption that lies behind the criticism above and show that it is a fair assumption.   
 What I think is missing in Peacocke’s answer is an explanation of why our 
modal concepts are epistemically felicitous—that is, an explanation of why they 
correctly and non-accidentally track external, constitutive truth—and, most 
importantly, an elucidation of the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for our 












Explicit knowledge of 
constitutive truths 
(EKC) 
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epistemological elucidation of our capabilities to know that something is a 
constitutive truth.  
 The assumption I need to justify is that, in the context of Peacocke’s views, it is 
legitimate to ask for what I think is missing. Before arguing that it is, let me offer the 
reasons someone could have to think that it is not. I will do this by elaborating on that 
crucial aspect of Peacocke’s account that my criticism might be said to neglect; and 
that Peacocke unfolds more explicitly in (Peacocke 2004 and 2008).  
 
Objection: Take the concept <chair>. On Peacocke’s theory of concepts, the 
possession conditions for <chair> are thick enough as to guarantee that the judgement 
that <this is a chair> as made by <chair>-possessors will typically amount to 
knowledge that this is a chair (Peacocke 2008, 141). If we think of it in terms of the 
word ‘chair’, we can grant that it is a matter of linguistic convention—and therefore 
contingent—that ‘chair’ picks up the property of being a chair. If we think of 
concepts as the lexicon of thought, one could also see some sort of contingency here: 
it is contingent that we possess the concept <chair>. It is crucial to note that this 
contingency is not enough to make the sentence ‘there are chairs’—or the thought 
<there are chairs>—mind-dependently true (e.g., true in virtue of our linguistic 
conventions or conceptual repertoire). Nominalist worries aside, there is room for 
mind-independence about chairs. The contingency of which words and concepts we 
use or have is compatible with facts about which entities fall under those concepts and 
words being mind-independent. (See (Peacocke 2008, 29 and 151).)  
 What my criticisms above would be neglecting, according to the current 
objection, is that Peacocke is offering a theory of modal concepts—and primarily of 
<possibility>—along the lines of his general theory of concepts: 
Possibility is that concept C, predicated of specifications, to possess which a 
thinker must have implicit knowledge of certain principles P1(C)... Pn(C), where 
one of these principles states that any specification falls under C only if any 
continuant object which exists, according to that specification, has its actual 
origins. (Peacocke 1999, 147) 
Our concept <possibility> is—like that of <chair>—individuated by its possession 
conditions, and its possession conditions are constituted by the Principles of 
Possibility, which in turn determine the semantic value of <possibility>. As such, 
possibility-judgements as made by <possibility>-possessors in normal conditions 
constitute knowledge. One of the principles, according to the above quotation, implies 
that origins other than the actual ones are impossible. Other principles impose other 
conditions. All these conditions are conditions on specifications—as it should be, 
since <possibility> is, as seen in §2, predicated of specifications. For any 
specification, s, either s satisfies all the conditions imposed, or it does not. If it does, s 
is possible; if it violates at least one, it is not. So, possibility is that property—referred 
to by <possibility>—that specifications have in virtue of satisfying all the Principles 
of Possibility. (To avoid unnecessary confusion, let me make explicit that a 
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specification satisfying all Principles of Possibility will be parasitic upon the 
assignment to which one such specification corresponds satisfying them all too.) 
 Given Peacocke’s metaphysics of <possibility>—the objection would go—there 
is not much to be said as to how we know possibility facts. Possessing the concept is, 
as Peacocke contends, enough to know modal facts; and that we possess the 
concept—together with Peacocke’s remarks on the epistemology of modality sketched 
in §2—should be enough as an explanation of how we know modal facts. Let us 
compare the following two cases. How do we know that chairs—as opposed to 
benches or sofas—satisfy the property of being designed to accommodate one person? 
Because this property is a condition for something to fall under <chair> and 
knowledge that this is so partially constitutes the possession conditions for <chair>. 
End of story. How do we know that <Madonna has origins different from her actual 
ones> is impossible? Because it violates one of the conditions for possibility and 
knowledge of these conditions constitutes the possession conditions for <possibility>. 
End of story.  
 As in the case of <chair>—the objector would insist—this is compatible with 
modal truth being mind-independent. There are certain conditions that specifications 
must satisfy to fall under <possibility>. Whether specifications satisfy those 
conditions is a mind-independent matter and, therefore, whether something is possible 
or not is not dependent on what is true about minds in any relevant sense. 
 Given the nature of <possibility>, therefore, the question about the knowability 
conditions for the principles should have a straightforward answer. They are the 
principles satisfaction of which is necessary and sufficient to fall under <possibility> 
and implicit knowledge of which is guaranteed to <possibility>-possessors. This 
crucial aspect of Peacocke’s account is nicely stressed and unfolded in (Peacocke 
2004, 171-2).  
 
Reply: I distinguish between the truth of what the objection appeals to, and the force 
of the objection. Truly enough, Peacocke’s metaphysics of <possibility> is crucial to 
his strategy to meet the integration challenge. I grant, furthermore, that my objection 
above might seem to neglect that aspect of his theory. I will argue next that, despite 
this crucial feature, it is still legitimate to ask about the knowability conditions for the 
Principles of Possibility.  
 If the objection is forceful, Peacocke was too concessive (1999, 166) in thinking 
that an epistemology of the constitutive is an urgent task for philosophy. To think 
so—the argument would go—can only be the consequence of underestimating the 
nature and power of the account. I believe, however, that Peacocke was not too 
concessive. My (exegetical) explanation of why he acknowledges the need for an 
epistemology of the constitutive is that he is aware that—despite his metaphysics of 
<possibility>—there are legitimate reasons to ask for it. Let me then elaborate on 
those reasons.  
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 We could introduce a number of different concepts in the vicinity of Peacocke’s 
<possibility>. For instance, we could introduce <possibility*>, whose constitutive 
principles (the Principles of Possibility*) are very similar to the Principles of 
Possibility, except that they imply that Humphrey is possibly* a poached egg, and that 
two plus two are possibly* five. Arguably, <possibility*> picks up a property, 
possibility*, and some might find it a very interesting one. There are in fact many 
properties in the vicinity of possibility and possibility* that one could potentially refer 
to by means of concepts similar to Peacocke’s <possibility>, all of which would be 
individuated by slightly different sets of principles. (With an extensional view on 
properties, one could argue that there are as many different properties as there are 
different partitions of C*—the set of all assignments—into two equivalence classes. 
Presumably, furthermore, nomic possibility, conceptual possibility and logical 
possibility, each of which characterized by different sets of principles, are amongst 
them.) 
 Pre-theoretically, modal concepts track constitutive truth; that is, truths about the 
nature and identity of things. So thinks Peacocke, reason for which his Principles of 
Possibility, the ones that individuate <possibility>, are said to be principles governing 
constitutive truth. (Note—in passing though importantly—that the account must 
accommodate this kind of mind-independence too; and not just the mind-
independence that the objector above was insisting upon.) By the assumption above, 
<possibility> and <possibility*> are not co-extensional. Between them, therefore, only 
one—at most—correctly tracks constitutive truth. Peacocke thinks <possibility> does. 
If this is so, it is against Humphrey’s nature to be a poached egg. Also, if this is so, we 
are epistemically very fortunate. We aim at a concept, C, that tracks mind-
independent constitutive truth, and the concept with which we intend to do so does so. 
This is a great success, especially because—given the potentially many deviant 
alternatives—we could easily have failed. We could easily possess instead 
<possibility*> playing the C-role. Constitutive truth is mind-independent, and this 
means that there are mind-independent correctness conditions that apply to the 
implicit conceptions that could potentially play the C-role. The implicit conception 
associated to <possibility*> would be incorrect to play it, because <possibility*> 
allows* for Humphrey to be a poached egg but this is (assumed to be) against his 
nature. The possibility of incorrect implicit conceptions is something Peacocke 
acknowledges (2004, 141-142). Furthermore, in the case of <possibility>, and given 
that the world (and not our minds) fixes constitutive truth, the door is wide open for 
incorrect implicit conceptions.10 
                                                 
10 Relatedly, Wright (2002b) notes that Peacocke-modality might (or might not) be the same 
(extensionally) as the pre-theoretical modality. He stresses that, for Peacocke’s account to succeed, we 
should recognize that they are the same—if-and-when they are. Wright’s complaint—stated in the form 
of a structural limitation—is that, using Peacocke’s concepts, we cannot recognize such a thing: “that 
apprehension would need to lie—necessarily!—beyond the reach of Peacocke’s account” (Wright 
2002b, 658). 
. 
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 It is therefore legitimate to ask how we achieve (in a way sufficient to ground 
modal knowledge) the correct concept. And this is a legitimate question especially to 
Peacocke, whose <possibility> is that rich in content. Given his metaphysics of 
<possibility>, his answer to this question will need to provide an explanation of how 
we are able to discriminate constitutive truth. It is not coincidental that this is the 
question Peacocke acknowledges we should be in a position to answer if we “do not 
want all the initial puzzlement about modality simply to be transferred to the domain 
of the constitutive” (1999, 166).  
 There are then two features of Peacocke’s account that—with a view to 
answering this potential objection—are salient: (i) Peacocke’s metaphysics of 
<possibility>; and (ii) that <possibility> tracks mind-independent constitutive truth. 
My criticisms above exploited at some point—in particular, with Case One—the 
theoretical possibility that (ii) is false: Maybe <possibility*> is after all the concept 
that correctly tracks constitutive truth? I did not put much effort there to distinguish 
the assumption that the Principles of Possibility are false statements about the 
constitutive, from the assumption that the Principles of Possibility are false statements 
about the possible. Given (i), however, failure to distinguish these two things could be 
misleading, if we were using Peacocke’s concepts. For note that, given (i), it is 
absolutely impossible for the Principles of Possibility to be false statements about the 
possible. To explain why, let me call to the reader’s attention that the extensions of 
‘Principles of Possibility’ and ‘Constitutive Principles’ could come apart. Let me 
recall also, from §2, that, according to Peacocke, Essentiality of Kind is a Principle of 
Possibility. Given this, even if being a poached egg was not against Humphrey’s 
nature—i.e., even if Essentiality of Kind was not a constitutive principle—we could 
not truly say so using Peacocke’s <possibility>. That Humphrey could be a poached 
egg would remain false, and the Principles of Possibility will remain true principles of 
the property possibility. Let us suppose that the Constitutive Principles are in fact the 
Principles of Possibility*. To express the intended truth, we should use the 
appropriate concepts: Humphrey could* be a poached egg. In other words, if (ii) is 
false, then, given (i), <possibility> does not refer to the property we intend to refer to 
by it, but to some other property in the vicinity. If the true mind-independent 
constitutive principles were instead the Principles of Possibility*, then possibility* 
would be the property we are after.  
 The point made above from reflection on cases One and Two might have 
induced a misinterpretation—as if I was not paying sufficient attention to the 
distinction between the Principles of Possibility and the Constitutive Principles. The 
reader can now retrospectively check, however, that I was careful with my choice of 
words. The point—as it was stated—survives even if we grant Peacocke, for the sake 
of discussion, (i) and (ii). Cases One and Two were used there to show that (EKC) 
depends on (EMK). After presenting these cases, I granted that Peacocke’s scenario is 
one in which (ii) is satisfied—and thus one in which the constitutive principles are the 
Principles of Possibility. When concepts are thought to be as rich as Peacocke 
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suggests—i.e., when granting also (i)—, however, how we manage to have the right 
concept playing the C-role is a legitimate question, especially in the face of the many 
deviant alternatives. As seen above, Peacocke acknowledges the need for an 
epistemology of the constitutive. However, he does not make explicit the reasons why 
this is a legitimate question, and offering those reasons has been the aim of this 
subsection.  
 To sum them up: The two-step abductive method yields—and I can grant this 
because I’m not objecting to abductive reasoning in general—explicit knowledge of 
the Principles of Possibility. But this will be true whether or not our modal concepts 
satisfy (ii). So knowledge of (which are) the Principles of Possibility cannot be freely 
assumed to amount to knowledge of (which are) the Constitutive Principles; and it is 
the latter we primarily need an epistemological elucidation of.  
 I complained in §3.1 that Peacocke’s answer about the explicit knowability of 
the principles only expands the explanatory chain in the wrong direction. An answer 
to how we manage to non-accidentally possess the right concept is what would 
expand the explanatory chain in the right direction, but this is missing in Peacocke’s 
remarks explored so far. Let me then turn to Peacocke’s answer to the question about 
the implicit knowability of the principles. The material in this subsection will help us 
identifying what the main problem with this second answer is.  
 
3.3 Implicit Knowledge of the Principles 
According to Peacocke  
The ordinary understander’s tacit knowledge may be acquired in the same way in 
which any other tacit knowledge that influences judgments, such as tacit knowledge 
of the definition of ‘chair’, or of the recursion for addition, may be acquired. 
Immersion of the learner in sufficiently many examples can generate an underlying 
state whose content explains the thinker’s classification of new examples. When 
this underlying state has the content of the Principles of Possibility, and has been 
acquired in ways that rule out other ‘nearby’ hypothesis about what ‘necessarily’ 
means, it will amount to tacit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility. (Peacocke 
2001, 112) 
On the basis of §3.2, we have to distinguish two questions. One is the question of how 
do we implicitly know the constitutive principles. The other is how do we implicitly 
know the Principles of Possibility. Failure to carefully distinguish these two questions 
might lead us astray because, if our <possibility> concept is deviant—and we saw in 
§3.2 that the door is wide open for this—one might have knowledge of the Principles 
of Possibility while lacking any constitutive knowledge (implicit or explicit). With 
this distinction in mind, let us evaluate Peacocke’s answer.  
 I shall use Case One again, and again for motivational purposes. Suppose then 
that our <possibility> concept is deviant and, in particular, that the possession 
conditions for <possibility> are constituted by false statements about the (mind-
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independent) constitutive realm. Immersion might still be effective in this scenario in 
generating in the learner an underlying state with the content of the implicit 
conception associated to <possibility>. The content of the underlying state in this 
scenario, however, cannot constitute tacit knowledge of the constitutive since, by 
hypothesis, this content consists of falsities about the constitutive. We know from 
§3.2 that, given (i)—Peacocke’s metaphysics of <possibility>—the principles will 
still be true Principles of Possibility. However, in this scenario, <possibility> does not 
refer to the property we are after. Consequently, while—granting (i)—immersion 
might generate tacit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility, this would not be 
targeting the relevant question. The question we should have an answer to is how we 
implicitly know the constitutive principles.  
 Similarly to what we saw in §3.1, one might complain that Case One cannot 
constitute a case against Peacocke since his starting point is that we have modal 
knowledge (pre-theoretically understood) and this assumption presumably rules out 
both the case where we possess deviant modal concepts (Case One) and also the case 
where we possess the right concept accidentally (Case Two). Let us then grant that 
<possibility> accurately tracks mind-independent constitutive truth, and that it is no 
accident that it does so.11  
 It is important to realize, however, that this assumption is only the recognition 
that there is a phenomenon in need of an explanation; namely, how we have managed 
to possess (non-accidentally) the right concept. If we could illuminate that, then, 
immersion might well be a correct answer to how the right concept is transferred to 
new learners in the linguistic community, who would thereby acquire implicit 
knowledge of the constitutive principles. That story being absent, however, the 
answer that appeals to immersion is, at best, incomplete. 
 Even granting Peacocke his assumption, cases One and Two allow us to realize 
two things that are important for current purposes. First, even when we might possess 
the right concept, immersion is not a good way to effectively answer the specific 
question about the implicit knowability of the constitutive principles. For immersion 
generates tacit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility whichever property 
<possibility> refers to. The immersion-answer, therefore, can hardly constitute an 
answer to the specific question about the cognitive capacities that enable us to 
discriminate constitutive truth.12 Second, the correctness of the immersion-answer 
depends on us non-accidentally possessing the right concept. On the basis of this 
dependence, I will next draw a distinction between the correctness and the 
                                                 
11 The problem I will identify in what follows is essentially an instance of the general problem 
Jenkins identifies in (Jenkins 2008b, 56-65). In her terms, we need an explanation why our concept of 
<possibility> is, not merely accurate, but grounded.  
12 Note, in addition, that, even in the case where we possess the right concept, additional 
explanatory work might be needed to link our knowledge of the Principles of Possibility (under this 
intension) to our knowledge of the constitutive principles (under this other intension). Presumably, the 
cognitive capacity responsible for our non-accidentally possessing the right concept will be 
indispensably involved here. This also relates to Wright’s objection in (Wright 2002b). 
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appropriateness of the immersion-answer and argue that, while correct—under the 
assumption that we non-accidentally possess the right concept—it is not appropriate 
to close the explanatory gap.  
 
Let me unfold both things simultaneously by means of a comparison to testimony. 
Peacocke’s case can be described as one in which implicit knowledge of the 
constitutive principles by <possibility>-possessors is transferred to new learners by 
means of a mechanism—immersion—that can be modelled by analogy to—though 
not equated with—testimony. In the case of testimony, transfer of knowledge that p 
requires prior knowledge that p. Let p be the proposition that penguins have knees. 
One way for me to know that p is by being told so by an expert. If I asked about the 
knowability conditions for p, an answer that appeals to deference and testimony in 
this way might be correct, but is not appropriate. The intended answer should 
elucidate acquisition of knowledge that p that is independent of prior knowledge that 
p. The comparison with testimony is intended as having heuristic value. Something to 
be highlighted is that the cognitive capacities involved in our inheriting knowledge 
that p through testimony need not be the same—and will typically not be the same—
as the capacities involved in our acquisition of firsthand knowledge that p. (Think of p 
as Fermat’s Theorem; or as the table is red as known through testimony by a blind 
person.) 
 I contend that Peacocke’s answer suffers, in a similar vein, from lack of 
appropriateness. The meaning of ‘possibility’ as reflected in use—by the linguistic 
behaviour of <possibility>-possessors—will yield tacit knowledge of the constitutive 
principles as long as <possibility> is non-accidentally the right concept. While the 
immersion-answer might correctly describe a route to implicit constitutive 
knowledge, it is not an answer that would allow Peacocke to complete the project of 
offering a satisfactory epistemology of modality. The answer is silent about the most 
important thing to this effect: an explanation of how the right concept is non-
accidentally acquired in the first place. For all we have been told, furthermore, and 
similarly to what happens in the testimony case, inheritors of <possibility> could even 
lack the relevant capacities which enabled former members of the linguistic 
community to acquire the right concept in the first place. This is why—as anticipated 
above—the immersion-answer can hardly constitute an answer to the specific 
question about the cognitive capacities that enable us to discriminate constitutive 
truth.  
 In sum, the story I find missing is, in the context of Peacocke’s views, 
presumably a story about the genesis of the right <possibility>. I do not need to 
speculate about possible stories here.13 For current purposes, it suffices to note the 
explanatory gap.  
                                                 
13 Someone might find attractive the empiricist account Jenkins outlines in her (2008b), although an 
empiricist route need not be mandatory.  
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4. Recap and Preview 
Let me briefly recap what has been developed hitherto and draw the relevant 
connections with the content of the next section.14 So far, I have only argued about an 
explanatory gap in Peacocke’s epistemology of modality. Without closing this gap, 
the Integration Challenge has not been met. Nothing I have developed so far, 
however, calls for any modification in Peacocke’s account. It could be left as it is and, 
supplemented with an appropriate epistemology of the constitutive, it could perhaps 
be said to satisfactorily meet the integration challenge.15  
 I think, however, that an urgent modification is in order. This has to do with 
Peacocke’s metaphysics of <possibility>. As we saw in §3.2, the metaphysics of 
<possibility> is given by the set of Principles of Possibility which in turn constitute its 
possession conditions. In the next section I will do, roughly, the following. First, I 
note that Peacocke’s possession conditions for <possibility> are (suspiciously) 
constituted by just the right amount of content that would allow Peacocke to 
implement his moderate rationalism. Second, I identify three problems around 
Peacocke’s possession conditions for modal concepts: the first two arise from their 
richness and demandingness and amount to implausibility worries; the third one 
amounts to a threat that <possibility>, as Peacocke thinks of it, might not be 
possessable in a way sufficient for modal knowledge. Third, I suggest a modification 
in the metaphysics of <possibility>—and its possession conditions—that avoids those 
three problems. Forth, I note that, by itself, the resulting account does not meet the 
Integration Challenge either; it too should be supplemented with an appropriate 
epistemology.  
 Nothing developed in this paper, however, suggests that the gap cannot be 
closed. As far as meeting the challenge is concerned, the next section stresses that 
Peacocke’s account and the modified version are on a par. However, it stresses also 
that, as far as the possession conditions for modal concepts are concerned, the 
modified account is less problematic. All things considered, therefore, the modified 
account is preferable. As we will see, this modified account cannot recycle 
Peacocke’s particular instance of moderate rationalism. This is, in relation to what 
has been developed so far, the most salient dialectical impact of the next section.   
 
5.  The Rule for <admissible>, and possession conditions 
Peacocke’s rule for <admissible> is extensionally given by the Modal Extension 
Principle (MEP) plus the battery of constitutive principles. In (Roca-Royes 2006), I 
sketch some alternative rules together with the reasons why Peacocke would not 
endorse them. Those alternatives are, however, open theoretical options, and an 
evaluation of their pros and cons is worth making. Here, I will compare Peacocke’s 
                                                 
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal who urged me to spell out these connections. 
15 Although see (Wright 2002b) for reasons for pessimism about it.  
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rule, (PR), with an alternative one, (ALT). After formulating them, I will argue that: 
(i) only (PR) is contentful enough to serve Peacocke’s strategy; (ii) since the 
challenge has not been met (if the arguments in §3 are correct), the replacement of 
(PR) with (ALT) would involve no extra loss; (iii) endorsement of (PR) is problematic 
in a way that (ALT) is not. Given (i)-(iii), (ALT) should be preferred.  
  
Let me start by formulating the rules. (PR) can be schematized as follows: 
(PR)   An assignment s is admissible iff: 
- For any concept C, the semantic value of C according to s is the 
result of applying the same rule as is applied in the determination 
of the actual semantic value of C. (This is the condition imposed by 
MEP.); and 
- Constitutive Principle-1; and 
- Constitutive Principle-2; and 
- Constitutive Principle-3; etc. 
(PR) lists all constitutive principles one by one. There is an asymmetry in the way 
(PR) treats constitutive facts about concepts and constitutive facts about entities at the 
level of reference. Whereas it rules all constitutive facts about concepts with one 
single principle, MEP, no analogous single principle rules all constitutive facts about 
the entities at the level of reference. A principle that would do so, in a way analogous 
to MEP, would be along the following lines:16 
(Const) An assignment s is admissible only if, for any entities e1...en 
(objects, properties or relations) and for any n-ary relation R, n1, 
such that entities e1...en constitutively stand in the relation R, s does 
not count Re1...en as false. 
Using (Const), we can formulate the alternative rule for <admissible>, (ALT):17 
(ALT)  An assignment s is admissible iff  
- For any concept C, the semantic value of C according to s is the 
result of applying the same rule as is applied in the determination 
of the actual semantic value of C. (This is the condition imposed by 
MEP.); and 
                                                 
16  For (Const) to be perfectly analogous to MEP, we may add that R holds “in the actual world”. 
This would straightforwardly give us S4. However, this would assume that constitutive facts are 
absolutely necessary of the objects. Although this may have strong intuitive appeal, it is desirable to 
offer a formulation that is neutral about it, even if Peacocke is not always neutral (see (Peacocke 1999, 
147)). Peacocke is aware that the way he formulates MEP lacks this neutrality, and justifies the 
corresponding assumption (Peacocke 1999, 148-9 and 152-3) that constitutive facts about concepts are 
necessarily so.  
17  It is due to Constrained Recombination that we can formulate both (ALT) and (PR) in bi-
conditional terms.  
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-   For any entities e1...en (objects, properties or relations) and for any 
n-ary relation R, n1, such that entities e1...en constitutively stand 
in the relation R, s does not count Re1...en as false. (This is the 
condition imposed by (Const).)  
 
The difference in symmetry between (PR) and (ALT) is relevant to argue for claim (i) 
of this section. The implicit conception associated with the concept <possibility> 
takes its material from the rule for <admissible>. Given the content of (PR), such 
implicit conception includes all Principles of Possibility. To non-accidentally possess 
the right <possibility>, therefore, one must implicitly know all the constitutive 
principles; it wouldn’t be enough to know a general principle along the lines of 
(Const). The implementation of Peacocke’s moderate rationalism requires (PR). For it 
is because of (PR)’s richness in content that possession of modal concepts can guide 
modal judgement in the way Peacocke suggests. When evaluating whether, for a 
certain entity, e, ‘possibly p(e)’ holds, any subject who possesses Peacocke’s 
<possibility> has available implicit knowledge as to whether e’s constitutive facts 
allow for e’s satisfaction of p(x). It is this implicit knowledge that guides the subject’s 
judgement that ‘possibly p(e)’ is true—when it is. (ALT), by contrast, cannot explain 
modal judgement in this way. If the possession conditions for <possibility> were 
determined by (ALT), the implicit knowledge that a subject would have in virtue of 
possessing this concept would be insufficient to unconditionally judge whether 
‘Possibly p(e)’ holds. The farthest this subject would get by deploying the implicit 
conception that (ALT) provides would be this: 
Possibly, p(e), if e’s constitutive facts allow for e’s satisfaction of p(x). 
In order for this subject to be able to discharge the antecedent, she would have to 
know e’s constitutive facts independently. Possession of (ALT)-<possibility> is 
certainly not informative enough for (unconditional) modal judgement and, 
consequently, it is insufficient for modal knowledge. Therefore, Peacocke cannot 
allow (ALT) to be the rule for <admissible> because it is not contentful enough for 
his moderate rationalism to have a chance to succeed.  
 To complete the argument for (i), I will now argue that (PR) is contentful 
enough by addressing a worry that it might not be. We noted above that (PR) treats 
constitutive facts about concepts and constitutive facts about entities at the level of 
reference asymmetrically. It is precisely due to the fact that (PR) lists all the 
constitutive principles, that <possibility>-possessors can unconditionally judge de re 
possibilities without antecedently possessing constitutive knowledge beyond that 
which is guaranteed by the possession of <possibility>: (PR) encodes all constitutive 
facts the subject needs to know in order to discharge the antecedent. By contrast, (PR) 
does not enable the subject to unconditionally judge de dicto possibilities. One could 
worry, therefore, that this threatens Peacocke’s moderate rationalism. I will argue 
next that, while there is something right in this worry, it is not particularly pressing.  
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 Given the content of MEP and the lack of specific conceptual principles, it is 
true that, in the conceptual case, possession of <possibility> will only allow us to get 
this far in our judgement:  
Possibly, there are unmarried bachelors if the rules governing the concepts 
unmarried and bachelor allow for their coherent co-applicability.  
As above, in order to be able to discharge the antecedent, the subject must have 
independent knowledge about the rules governing the concepts unmarried and 
bachelor. Possession of <possibility> plus our independent knowledge of those rules 
would give us all we need to unconditionally reach de dicto modal judgements. I 
contend, however, that the asymmetry of (PR) does not seriously threaten Peacocke’s 
strategy because an adequate epistemology for constitutive facts about concepts 
appears to be available—and the phenomenon of conceptual knowledge less puzzling. 
This contrasts with the de re case.  
 This concludes the reasons for (i). To summarize them, (PR) provides the 
minimum amount of content that allows Peacocke to implement his strategy. (ALT) 
provides less than that, and a third hypothetical rule that would replace (MEP) with a 
battery of specific constitutive principles for concepts would be richer than needed. Of 
the two rules considered here, therefore, only (PR) has a chance to serve Peacocke’s 
moderate rationalism.  
 
In §3, I argued that the challenge has not been met. If those arguments are correct, and 
if I am right that the main reasons for preferring (PR) to (ALT) have to do with 
epistemological concerns, then, we seem to have enough reasons for claim (ii) 
above—that no extra explanatory power would be lost if we replaced (PR) with 
(ALT). For despite the account’s endorsement of the richer (PR), an epistemology of 
the constitutive is nonetheless missing in the account. Consequently, the extra content 
in (PR) is not, against what might have been intended, helping to meet the integration 
challenge. As anticipated by (iii), furthermore, there are reasons to prefer (ALT) to 
(PR) which have to do with the different possession conditions for modal concepts 
that these two rules imply. Let me now elaborate on them.  
 
The first worry concerning (PR) comes from its richness in content. (PR) encodes a 
whole theory about the (mind-independent) constitutive realm. One might then 
complain that the possession conditions for <possibility> are, as a result, highly 
controversial and arguably too demanding. Peacocke’s claim that “someone who 
understands modal discourse has a form of implicit knowledge of the Principles of 
Possibility” (1999, 125) would be hardly problematic if those principles only said 
what (MEP) and (Const) say: namely, that metaphysical modality is a matter of what 
is allowed by constitutive facts. It is more controversial, however, when the Principles 
already say what these facts are. 
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 A second worry—somehow related to the first—arises from modal 
disagreement. On Peacocke’s account, when two subjects disagree about some modal 
fact, at least one of them either is making a mistake—not being appropriately 
employing the implicit knowledge of the principles that she has in virtue of possessing 
the concepts—or does not possess modal concepts. I find this explanation wanting. 
First, against the second disjunct, modal disagreements are frequent among 
sophisticated modal philosophers of whom it would be implausible to claim that they 
do not possess modal concepts. Second, against the first disjunct, implicit knowledge 
of the principles, even though implicit, is assumed to be quite close to the personal 
level (Peacocke 1999, 164). This suggests that it should not be particularly difficult 
for sophisticated thinkers who possess modal concepts to appropriately employ this 
implicit knowledge in reaching modal judgements.18  
 The final reason why (ALT) is preferable requires a bit more interpretation; we 
need to look at the consequences of what Peacocke writes in different places. First, as 
just mentioned, Peacocke claims that  
Implicit knowledge of the Principles of Possibility seems to be rather closer to the 
operations of reason at the personal level than is the classic Chomskian case of tacit 
knowledge of the principles of grammar of our natural language. (Peacocke 1999, 
164) 
Second, once we implicitly know these Principles, there would be a fairly simple two-
step abductive process that would result in explicit knowledge of them. Finally, 
Peacocke adds to this that we are not guaranteed that all the principles are knowable: 
There is no obvious reason that we should be able to know the constitutive 
properties and relations of each item in our ontology. It takes hard philosophical 
investigation to discover them, and we may be intellectually limited in our ability to 
attain knowledge of them. (Peacocke 1999, 166; my emphasis) 
It is not obvious whether it is implicit or explicit unknowability that Peacocke is 
thinking of here. He might be suggesting that we might not be able to explicitly know 
all the Constitutive Principles, compatibly with us nonetheless knowing them all 
implicitly by virtue of possessing <possibility>. I shall argue, however, that whatever 
reasons there are to think that some principles might be explicitly unknowable are also 
reasons to support—in his account—their implicit unknowability too. First, it will be 
at least odd to say that, in virtue of possessing modal concepts, we know all the 
principles implicitly but might be “intellectually limited” to know them explicitly. 
Second, when implicit knowledge of these principles is as close to the personal level 
as Peacocke suggests, and when it is relatively easy—by means of the two-step 
abductive process—to make them explicit, it would be odd also to claim that 
<possibility>-possessors know all the principles implicitly but might not be able to 
know (some of) them explicitly. Third, if Peacocke’s suggestion was that all the 
                                                 
18  Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for calling my attention to this. 
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principles are implicitly known, while some might not be explicitly knowable, the 
task would remain for him to tell us how the abductive method he describes, which 
would lead us to explicit knowledge of the principles, could allow us to know only 
some of them. This appears to be particularly difficult. For, if we implicitly know all 
the Principles, and given the proximity to the personal level, nothing should prevent 
us from being able to use an abductive base strong enough to support the explicit 
articulation of all of them.19 
 If some constitutive principles might be unknowable even implicitly, then, 
endorsing (PR) commits us to the claim that we might not be able to possess 
<possibility> in a grounded20 way—i.e., in a way sufficient for modal knowledge. I 
shall call this ‘the (grounded) unpossessability threat”.21 The problem arises because 
Peacocke seems to value—as a desideratum—that his theory leaves room for partial 
modal scepticism. This desideratum, however, is in tension with his moderate 
rationalism. For, as we have seen above, Peacocke’s particular kind of moderate 
rationalism depends on the rule for <admissible> being (PR), and (PR) requires 
implicit knowledge—and therefore knowability—of all the Principles of Possibility.22 
 A hint on how to escape this tension without renouncing the desideratum can be 
found in what follows. Peacocke suggests that also some conceptual constitutive facts 
might be unknowable: 
There is no obvious guarantee that everything which is constitutively involved in 
possession of a particular concept, even one of our concepts, must be 
discoverable by us. (Peacocke 1999, 166) 
This kind of potential unknowability, however, and due to (PR)’s asymmetry, does 
not threaten the (grounded) possessability of <possibility>. For even when we may 
not know that R is the constitutive rule of a given concept C, we may still know MEP 
(the only Principle of Possibility at the level of concepts), which only requires us to 
know the conditional that: if R is the constitutive rule of C, then any admissible 
assignment determines the semantic value of C by applying rule R. Compatibly with 
non-accidentally possessing Peacocke’s <possibility>, therefore, we may know this 
conditional without knowing whether the antecedent is true or false.  
 After this hint, a way of avoiding the tension presents itself: (ALT) avoids the 
(grounded) unpossessability threat at both the conceptual and the de re levels. If the 
                                                 
19  Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to clarify this. 
20  I’m borrowing Jenkins terminology in (2008b). 
21  To be clear, we could still accidentally possess the right concept—i.e., we could still be in 
Case Two. Yet, if it is an accident that we possess it, Peacocke’s claim (1999, 162) that modal 
judgment reached by appropriately employing modal concepts can count as knowledge should lose all 
its plausibility.  
22  Given that this implicit knowledge is supposed to guide modal judgement in a way sufficient 
for knowledge, it is difficult to combine the claim that we have implicit knowledge of all of them with 
partial modal scepticism. To this effect, a potential distinction between principles that guide and 
principles that cannot guide modal judgement should not only be made but it should also be made 
plausible. Nothing like this, however, has even been suggested by Peacocke.  
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possession conditions for <possibility> were given by the conjunction of both MEP 
and (Const), the unknowability of particular de re constitutive principles would have, 
for analogous reasons, no negative effect on the grounded possessability of 
<possibility>. Importantly, this way of avoiding this tension also avoids the first two 
(implausibility) worries. This concludes my argument for (iii). 
 
With (i)-(iii) in place, therefore, the (ALT)-account should be acknowledged as 
preferable. This modified account does not allow us to reach unconditionalized modal 
judgements in the way Peacocke thinks we reach it. It cannot, therefore, support 
Peacocke’s moderate rationalism. 
 
§6. Concluding remarks and prospects 
In §5, I argued that (PR) encodes the minimum amount of content needed to 
implement Peacocke’s moderate rationalism. This content, however, even though 
minimal in this sense, exceeds what could plausibly constitute the possession 
conditions for modal concepts, and this gave us a reason to prefer (ALT) instead. 
Furthermore, when those possession conditions are said to include a whole theory of 
the (mind-independent) constitutive realm, and when we are not guaranteed to have 
full epistemic access to such realm, the worry arises that we are not guaranteed to be 
able to non-accidentally possess <possibility>. The fact that (ALT) avoids this 
problem too gave us a further reason to prefer it.  
 If we endorse (ALT), we still will need to develop an epistemology of modality. 
For (ALT) only requires of <possibility>-possessors that they know that possibility is 
a matter of what is allowed by constitutive truths, while remaining silent about which 
these are. However, §3 argues that even endorsing (PR), we are also missing a 
satisfactory epistemology of modality. All things considered, therefore, there is no 
need to endorse Peacocke’s highly demanding possession conditions for <possibility>. 
 
A residual—though nonetheless important—question is whether an epistemology of 
the constitutive is forthcoming. This is not the place for me to say anything positive 
about it. Instead, I will only identify one further difference between Peacocke’s 
account and the modified one. The difference has to do with how under pressure these 
accounts are to offer an epistemology of the constitutive.  
 It should be clear by now that, given Peacocke’s metaphysics of <possibility>, 
he is under pressure to offer an epistemology of the constitutive principles. Things are 
otherwise for the modified account. According to it, possession of modal concepts 
allows us to know only conditionals of the sort:  
Possibly, p(e), if e’s constitutive facts allow for e’s satisfaction of p(x). 
There are two things to be noted here. First, as far as the metaphysics of <possibility> 
is concerned, this account is not committed to any unconditionalized modal 
knowledge. Because of this, the modified account is compatible with radical modal 
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agnosticism or scepticism. Consequently, all pressure that an (ALT)-account will be 
under to offer an epistemology of the constitutive will result from the accounts’ 
explicit commitments regarding the knowability of modal truth that will need to be 
added as independent premises. Second, even when some modal truths were claimed 
to be knowable, the account—unlike Peacocke’s—is not committed to the 
knowability of all-if-some; so it is compatible also with different degrees of partial 
modal agnosticism or scepticism. For, unlike Peacocke’s, the (skeleton of the) 
modified account is silent on whether it is the antecedent or the consequent of the 
conditional above that has epistemic priority.23 We might know that e’s constitutive 
facts allow for e’s satisfaction of p(x) on the basis of prior knowledge of what those 
constitutive facts are. Alternatively, we might know first that possibly, p(e), thereby 
being in a position to know that, whatever facts are constitutive of e, they allow for 
e’s satisfaction of p(x). In this latter case, we might possess a great deal of possibility 
knowledge without being in a position to infer any constitutive principle.24 There is 
room here for agnosticism or scepticism about all the constitutive principles without it 
amounting to agnosticism or scepticism about all possibility-facts. 
 It would be wrong to think, therefore, that a satisfactory epistemology of 
modality will always depend on a satisfactory epistemology of the constitutive. The 
modified account is very versatile about the kind of epistemology of modality it can 
be made compatible with. It has not met the integration challenge, but this is not to 
say that the challenge cannot be met somehow, and it leaves room for many different 
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